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Does Food Aid Really Discourage Food Production?
Abstract
We examine whether food aid necessarily acts as a disincentive to food production in recipient
economies.  Since structural deficiencies of markets are a central reason why low-income agrarian
economies receive food aid, we adopt a modeling framework that accommodates incomplete or
imperfect markets.  This simple, nonseparable, representative household model highlights the factor
market effects of food aid overlooked in conventional, Schultzian analyses and, thus, the ambiguous
effects of food aid on food production incentives in recipient economies.  3
Does Food Aid Really Discourage Food Production?
Food aid has long been criticized as a potential disincentive to recipient country agricultural
production.  Schultz (1960) argued that food aid can drive down local food prices by increasing the
domestic supply of food, thereby reducing incentives to recipient country food producers and
potentially retarding economic development.  The existence of partial equilibrium output price
disincentives of this sort seems widely accepted in the literature (Maxwell and Singer 1979), although
some analysts have wondered whether the potential income effects on food demand might mitigate
or even offset these Schultzian disincentive effects (Fisher 1963).  
However, the analytical food aid literature relies on implausible Arrow-Debreu models, even
though the structural deficiencies of recipient country markets are a central reason why they receive
food aid.  Moreover, given that the literature on agricultural production in poor countries generally
pays great attention to factor markets — not just to product markets — we find it puzzling that the
literature on food aid generally ignores factor market (dis)incentives created by food aid shipments.
This paper therefore revisits the issue of the incentives to food production in food aid recipient
economies by employing a model that accommodates incomplete or imperfect markets, thereby
enabling identification of potential indirect effects through factor markets.  The net effect is that food
aid generates ambiguous incentives for food producers in recipient economies.
I.  A Nonseparable Representative Household Model of the Recipient Economy
This paper uses a nonseparable household model to analyze the impacts of exogenous food
aid shocks on recipient economy food production volumes.  Before presenting the model, let us4
briefly explain our model selection strategy.  Food aid is a macroeconomic phenomenon, while output
response is an inherently microeconomic one.  General equilibrium modeling is commonly used to
integrate macroeconomic and microeconomic concerns because it endogenizes nontradables’ prices.
Nonetheless, in this paper we adopt a partial equilibrium approach combined with sensitivity analysis
on the principle of parsimony: it is the simplest model which generates results invariant to the
introduction of greater complexity into the model.  If the objective was to derive specific estimates
of food aid’s net effects in a particular setting, one could empirically implement our nonseparable
household model by nesting it in computable general equilibrium (CGE) simulations, following
DeJanvry et al. (1992).  Our objective in this paper is, however, more modest: to establish the
analytical ambiguity of food aid’s incentive effects on recipient country food production and the need
for empirical analysis, for which CGE modeling may offer one useful approach.
Almost a quarter of the world’s population belongs to peasant households in low- and
middle-income countries.  Recent advances in the theory of household decision-making emphasize
complex relationships between consumption, labor allocation, and production decisions in peasant
households that consume a significant proportion of their own output (Singh et al. 1986; DeJanvry
et al. 1991).  These households are commonly found in villages where poor transportation and
communications infrastructure — and hence high transactions costs — and low disposable incomes
constrain market participation.  Selective labor and financial market failures are consequently
common.  When (perhaps household-specific) market failures occur, household utility maximization
no longer reduces production decisions to familiar profit-maximization choice rules.  Rather,
consumption, labor allocation, and production decisions become inextricable; these models are
therefore often called “nonseparable” household models.  Nonseparable models accommodate5
selective market failures, e.g., for labor and/or finance, that condition producers’ response to external
shocks, such as the delivery of food aid.  Given the weakness of markets in food aid recipient
economies, a nonseparable representative household model could be useful in assessing analytically
the effects of food aid on producer incentives.
Following DeJanvry et al. (1991), we therefore consider a representative household that owns
a plot of land and produces agricultural commodities.  Those factors and products that are tradable
in the market are said to belong to the set T, those that are nontradable due to excessive transactions
costs, risk, or other reasons belong to the set N.  Production of these crops employs labor (Ql ) and
a purchased input (Qx ) on a fixed amount of land (D) to produce cash crops (Qc ) and food (Qf ).  The
household maximizes utility defined over consumption of food (Cf), a manufactured product traded
in the market (Cm ), and leisure (Cl ). Assume the utility function is monotonic, twice differentiable,
and concave in each of its arguments.  The household faces a technology constraint, a budget
constraint, and a time constraint.  Its problem is thus 
Max U (C) (1)
C,Q
s.t Z (Q|D) = 0 (2)
Pc’Ct # Pq’Qt + M ￿ t0T  (3)
Cn + Qn # Wn ￿ n0N  (4)
where boldface type denotes a vector, Pc is the subvector of prices associated with tradable
consumption goods, Ct is the subvector of consumption volumes for tradable goods, Pq is the
subvector of prices associated with tradable production netputs, Qt is the subvector of tradable
production netput volumes, M represents exogenous income transfers, and Wn  is the vector of
nontradable endowments (in particular, time).  Food aid may comprise part of transfers when food
is tradable, i.e., M = APf + Bwhen f0T, where A represents food aid volumes and B represents6
nonfood monetary transfers.  If food is a nontradable, then M=B and food aid comprises the food
endowment of the representative household, i.e., Wf = A. Assuming U’ > 0, constraints (3) and (4)
will bind.  The Lagrangian to this problem may be written as
￿ = U(C) + RZ(Q) + 8 8(PqQt - Pc Ct + M) + T T’(W - Q - C) (5)
where R represents the marginal utility of technology improvement, 8 is the marginal utility of income,
and T T can be regarded as the vector of marginal utilities of an extra unit of each nontradable good.
This formulation obviously accommodates transactions costs that drive a wedge between the
purchase and sale prices of tradables, food that is either tradable or nontradable, multioutput
technologies, etc., and implicitly reflects the absence of markets in land and finance; it is very
generally applicable to low-income agrarian economies.
We treat labor as nontradable because in the recipient economies of interest, the vast majority
of labor is engaged on the worker's own farm at a shadow wage that differs from any market wage
(DeJanvry et al. 1991; Fafchamps 1993; Jacoby 1993; Skoufias 1994).  Given that food can be
reasonably classified as either tradable or nontradable in many low-income agrarian economies
(Barrett and Carter 1997), we consider both cases: nontradable and tradable food.  Since commercial
inputs to food production and cash crops are almost always tradable, we treat them as belonging to
the set T.  Representing the shadow price of nontradables as  Pn* = Tn/8, and the price of tradable
goods as Pi* = Pi, we then have the standard first-order conditions for constrained utility
maximization. 
Ui = 8Pi* ￿ Ci (6)
RZj = –8Pj* ￿ Qj (7)
Z (Q|D) = 0 (8)
Pc’Ct = Pq’Qt + M ￿ t0T (9)
Cn + Qn = Wn ￿ n0N (10)7
Algebraic manipulation of these conditions yields a generalized profit function, A*(Pq*) = Pq*’Q, a
system of factor demand and output supply functions, Q = Q(Pq*), an expression for household full
income, Y* = A* + Pl*Wl + Pf*A + B, and a system of demand equations, C = C(Pc*, Y*).  One can
also derive an equation for the endogenous shadow value of nontradables, Pn* = Pn*(P-n*, A, B),
where P-n* is the shadow price vector, P*, excluding Pn*.  The incentive effects of food aid come
through its influence on Y* (via M in the case of tradable food, via Wf in the case of nontradable
food) and on the price vector, P*. 
II.  The Opposing Effects of Food Aid on Peasant Producer Households
If food is nontradable, then food aid clearly has Schultzian (negative) effects on food prices,
because it relaxes the availability constraint (4), thereby lowering Tf and thus Pf*.  If food is tradable,
then the recipient economy is a price taker on the international market.  Nonetheless, food aid may
impact recipient economy food prices through real exchange rate appreciation induced by the balance
of payments effects caused by the substitution of food aid for commercial food imports.  Despite the
rhetoric of the international food aid convention, which requires maintenance of “usual marketing
requirements” (UMRs) so that food aid is purely “additional” to commercial trade flows, the literature
on food aid clearly shows that the additionality principle is commonly violated (Maxwell and Singer
1979; von Braun and Huddleston 1988).  Food aid typically reduces recipients’ commercial food
imports, thereby relaxing balance of payments constraints.  If that relaxation is considerable, it could
induce real exchange rate appreciation, thereby reducing the price of tradables.  If food aid has no
effect on the real exchange rate and food is tradable, there will be no product price effect.  Food aid
should thus have nonpositive price effects on recipient economy food prices, irrespective of whether8
food is tradable or nontradable.  
Since the violation of additionality may induce exchange rate appreciation, leading to
nonpositive effects on all tradables’ prices, there may be factor market effects as well as output
market effects.  Since most low-income agrarian nations import a substantial portion of commercial
agricultural inputs (e.g., inorganic fertilizer, machinery), relaxing the balance of payments
constraint—the macroeconomic analog to the representative household's budget constraint—may
stimulate food production in recipient economies.  Just as incremental food aid shocks are expected
to lead to nonpositive changes in the domestic market price of food, Pf*, so would they lead to
nonpositive changes in the price of tradable inputs, Px*.  This is the root of the inherently ambiguous
producer incentive effects of food aid.  Factor and product market incentives move in opposing
directions, so the impact of food aid on producer incentives and output volumes turns on the relative
magnitudes of these effects; it is an inherently empirical question.
We can formalize this argument using the simple model of section I.  The output response of

































The first term on the right-hand side of (11) is the Schultzian partial equilibrium supply response.
This is nonpositive because MQf/MPf*>0, from the output supply function, and dPf*/dA#0 by the
arguments of the preceding paragraph if food is tradable, while dPf*/dA= d(Tf/8)/dA<0 if food is
nontradable. Two additional factor market effects must be considered.  The third term will be
nonnegative.  It is positive if food aid relaxes the balance of payments constraint, prompting exchange
rate appreciation, dPx*/dA<0, and permitting additional intermediate imports at reduced domestic9
price.  It is zero if there are no exchange rate effects (since then dPx*/dA=0).  The output response
to food aid is thus analytically ambiguous because of the opposing partial equilibrium effects in
product and factor markets.  This ambiguity is reinforced by the labor allocation incentive effects of
food aid shown in the second term of (11).  
Although MQf /MPl
* is unambiguously negative by the convexity of the profit function, food aid
has ambiguous effects on the shadow wage, as is evident by totally differentiating (10) and the
expression for household full income, Y*, then rearranging terms (see the appendix for a derivation).
The response of the shadow wage to food aid depends on whether there is an induced fall in Pf*, on
any increase in leisure demand stimulated by the transfer — whether in liquid form for tradable food,
as captured in M, or in illiquid form for nontradable food, as captured in Wf —  and on the profit































































The denominator of (12) cannot be unambiguously signed since the bracketed term contains a positive
term, Wl, and a negative one, MA/MPl*.  As reflected in (13), the first term in the numerator, S,
captures the responses of household labor demand and supply to changes (if any) in the output price,
Pf*, and the nonlabor input price, Px*, induced by increased food aid flows.  If food is tradable and
food aid has no effect on the real exchange rate, then S=0.  That is not sufficient, however, for food
aid to have no effect on shadow wages.  The second term in the numerator of (12) represents the10
positive profit effect of an additional unit of food aid on leisure consumption.  Thus, even when food
aid has no impact on tradables prices, if labor markets are incomplete — as seems typical of low-
income agrarian economies characterized by significant transactions costs — then food aid will have
shadow wage effects that are nonzero but of ambiguous sign, reflecting the broader juxtaposition of
product market disincentives and factor market incentives to food production.  Despite widespread
acceptance in the food aid literature, the simple but quite general model presented here demonstrates
that negative Schultzian effects do not necessarily emerge in low-income agrarian economies
characterized by incomplete markets — as is typical of food aid recipient nations.   Rather, the
incentive effects of food aid are analytically ambiguous, with countervailing factor and product
market effects within the tradables sector and ambiguous effects on labor use patterns.
Moreover, a careful study of equations (11) and (12) reveals that it is not possible to predict
easily whether factor market or product market effects will dominate.  The balance of payments
effects that stimulate output by reducing purchased input prices simultaneously exert upward pressure
on the shadow wage, thereby discouraging agricultural employment at the margin.  Conversely, the
product market disincentive effects to food production exert downward pressure on the shadow
wage, inducing  countervailing employment effects at the margin.  Schultz's prediction becomes
analytically ambiguous once one considers the richness of incomplete markets and nonseparable
household decision-making in poor agrarian economies.  The economic effects of food aid are
fundamentally an empirical question, one warranting further research. 
III.  Conclusion11
This brief analytical note revisits the long-standing debate concerning the effects of food aid
on food producer incentives in recipient economies.  We explore the implications of nonseparable
household decisions caused by widespread nonparticipation in labor, land, financial and/or food
markets, as is typical of the low-income food aid recipient economies in which this issue is of greatest
concern.  The classic Schultzian findings do not hold under more general conditions.  Rather, the
selective market failures that permeate low-income, high-transactions-cost economies significantly
complicate analysis of the effects of policy interventions, rendering analytically ambiguous the sign
of the key relationships.  A natural consequence is the cross-sectional and intertemporal heterogeneity
of output responses to similar food aid disbursement histories, as evident in the literature.
Our model provides analytical support for common anecdotal accounts (Maxwell and Singer
1979).  For example, because food aid is not wholly additional (i.e., it is to some degree a substitute
for commercial food imports), relaxing recipients' balance of payments constraints may stimulate
factor employment even as food prices fall in product markets.  The classic theoretical work on food
aid (Schultz 1960; Fisher 1963) and subsequent modeling efforts ignore these effects.  Much as it is
preferable to investigate the incentive effects of trade and exchange rate policies by studying effective
rates of protection (which consider both factor and product market effects) rather than nominal
protection coefficients (which are based only on product prices), so too is it important to emphasize
the multiple, countervailing impacts of food aid across the full range of markets in which low-income
food producers operate.  Ascertaining the economic effects of food aid thus fundamentally requires
empirical study. 12
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Appendix
Begin with equation (10) and the expression for household full income derived from the
first-order conditions (6)-(10). 
(i) Cl (P*, Y* ) = Wl  - Ql (P*) 
(ii) Y* = B+Pf*A + A*+ Pl*Wl
Next, totally differentiate both expressions. 
(iii)   MCl/MPl*@dPl*+MCl/MPf*@dPf *+ MCl/MY*@dY* = - MQl/MPl* @ dPl* - MQl/MPf*@ dPf*- MQl/MPx*@dPx*
(iv)  dY* = Pf* @dA + A@dPf* + MA/MPl* @ dPl* + MA/MPf* @ dPf*+ MA/MPx*@ dPx *+Wl @ dPl*
Noting that 
(v) dPf*= MPf*/MA @ dA
and
(vi)  dPx*= MPx*/MA @ dA
substitute (v) and (vi) into (iv) and rearrange terms.
(vii) dY* = (MA/MPl* +Wl) dPl*+ [Pf* +MPf*/MA(A+MA/MPf*) + MA/MPx*@ MPx*/MA]dA 
Now substitute (v), (vi) and (vii) into (iii).
(viii) MCl/MPl*@dPl*+MCl/MPf*@MPf*/MA@dA+MCl/MY*{(MA/MPl*+Wl)dPl*+ [Pf* +MPf*/MA(A+MA/MPf*)
+MA/MPx*@MPx*/MA]dA} = - MQl/MPl*@dPl*-(MQl/MPf*@MPf */MA+ MQl/MPx*@MPx*/MA)dA 
Then rearrange terms.
(ix) {MCl/MPl* + MCl/MY*(MA/MPl* + Wl)+MQl/MPl*}dPl* = -{MCl/MPf*@MPf*/MA + MCl/MY*[Pf* +
MPf*/MA(A+MA/MPf*)+MA/MPx*@MPx*/MA] +MQl/MPf*@MPf */MA+MQl/MPx*@MPx*/MA}dA     
Finally, divide through both sides.
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